Here are some of my current research projects:
The Need for Refinement in Triaging against Algorithmic Leviathans
This paper argues that classifier ensembles, which have been put foward as a solution to the problem of overextended algorothms, should be subject of the same scrutiny and effort to avoid bias that we give to indivudal classifiers.
Possibly Troubling Testimony about Modal Testimony
In this paper, I argue that modal claims often cannot be deffered to and yet it's epistemically secure that these same claims have mind independent truth values; the upshot of this is a more permissive account of believing.
The Need for Refinement in Triaging against Algorithmic Leviathans
This paper argues that classifier ensembles, which have been put foward as a solution to the problem of overextended algorothms, should be subject of the same scrutiny and effort to avoid bias that we give to indivudal classifiers.
Possibly Troubling Testimony about Modal Testimony
In this paper, I argue that modal claims often cannot be deffered to and yet it's epistemically secure that these same claims have mind independent truth values; the upshot of this is a more permissive account of believing.
The Complexity of Disagreement and the Steadfastness-Conciliationism Debate
Here I clarify that disagreement, and our exposure to it, is a complex adaptive system. In arguing this, I further establish that if that's right, then there are reasons to prefer steadfast accounts over conciliationism, especially compared to equal weight views of conciliationism.
Here I clarify that disagreement, and our exposure to it, is a complex adaptive system. In arguing this, I further establish that if that's right, then there are reasons to prefer steadfast accounts over conciliationism, especially compared to equal weight views of conciliationism.
Epistemic Insouciance is Not a Moral Vice
This paper concerns distinguishing epistemic insouciance from epistemic malevolence. I contend that epistemic malevolence is often misunderstood as insouciance, and that true epistemic insouciance is not morally problematic.
This paper concerns distinguishing epistemic insouciance from epistemic malevolence. I contend that epistemic malevolence is often misunderstood as insouciance, and that true epistemic insouciance is not morally problematic.
A Wager Against Criminalizing Insider Betting (With Nathaniel Stagg)
In this paper, Nathan and I point out that despite our strong feelings that insider "trading" on prediction markets is deeply wrong, there is seemingly no analogy to the stock market that would justify criminilazing insider trading on prediction markets. As such, any attempt to make an analogy either requires eliminating prediction markets entirely, or otherwise doesn't apply at all.
In this paper, Nathan and I point out that despite our strong feelings that insider "trading" on prediction markets is deeply wrong, there is seemingly no analogy to the stock market that would justify criminilazing insider trading on prediction markets. As such, any attempt to make an analogy either requires eliminating prediction markets entirely, or otherwise doesn't apply at all.